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Abstract: 
This paper investigates the relative magnitude of the components in the bid-ask spread 
around earnings announcements using the method in Stoll (1989). The results show that 
earnings surprises convey relevant pricing information and that significant information 
asymmetry exists between the market makers and the informed traders. Around negative 
earnings announcements the adverse-selection component and the trading volume increase 
while the inventory-holding and order-processing components decrease. This leads to a 
decrease in the realized spread. The magnitude of the change in the realized spread appears 
to be important but the change in the quoted bid-ask spread is negligible. The overall result 
implies that the informed traders’ ability to assess firms’ performance only affect the bid-
ask spread around the time of the earnings announcements. 
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I. Introduction 
This paper investigates the components of the bid-ask spread and analyzes the changes in 
the spread around earnings announcements. The capital market reaction to earnings an-
nouncements depends on whether the earnings news contains a positive surprise or a nega-
tive surprise. Earnings announcements are shown to convey relevant pricing information 
that makes it possible to investigate informed investors' advantage in their trading mecha-
nisms. Several studies attempt to explain the impact the quoted bid-ask spread has on asset 
returns.2 Recently, bid-ask spread models examine the behavior of market makers around 
corporate announcements, such as earnings announcements. For example, Krinsky and Lee 
(1996) examine announcement effects with the existence of asymmetric information about 
expected earnings. They find significant and increasing adverse-selection costs around 
earnings announcements. Similar to Krinsky and Lee (1996), this study shows the devel-
opment in adverse-selection costs, inventory-holding costs, and order-processing costs us-
ing quoted prices and transaction prices from firms that are listed on the Copenhagen Stock 
Exchange. The three components of the quoted bid-ask spread may be sufficient to cover 
the market makers' expected compensation for making transactions. However, the market 
makers' realized compensation for providing the liquidity service is the effective bid-ask 
spread.3 It is therefore important to recognize the economic magnitude of the spread.  
 
If market makers recover costs through the bid-ask spread, it is reasonable to assume that 
information asymmetry will widen the spread around earnings announcements. Krinsky and 
Lee (1996) propose two hypotheses, the first argues for an increase in the adverse-
selection costs prior to earnings announcement because market makers face a greater prob-
ability of trading with an informed trader that may possess superior information about ex-
pected earnings. The second hypothesis is that the adverse-selection costs increase after 
earnings announcements because informed traders assess a firm's performance on the basis 
                                                
2 See Roll (1984), Glosten (1987), Glosten and Harris (1988), Copeland and Galai (1988), Stoll (1989), 
George, Kaul and Nimalendran (1991), Affleck-Graves, Hedge, and Miller (1994), and Krinsky and Lee 
(1996). 
3 The difference between a dealer’s ask and bid prices is the quoted bid-ask spread and the realized or ef-
fective bid-ask spread is the average difference between traded ask and bid prices. The quoted spread is 
almost always less than the realized spread and in the United State it is about half the quoted spread. See 
Stoll (1989). 
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of the announcements and superior information. The investigation of the adverse-selection 
component, using information asymmetric models, suggests that greater information asym-
metry between traders and market makers induce a wider bid-ask bounce. Informed market 
participants incorporate superior information about expected earnings in the pricing proc-
ess, which forces the market maker to increase the spread as temporary protection against 
information asymmetry. This study shows that the sum of the three bid-ask components do 
not change significantly from the pre-event period to the event period. The adverse-
selection costs change from 52 percent in the pre-event to 72 percent in the event period. 
This indicates that market makers informational uncertainty about informed traders is in-
creasing. The inventory-holding and order-processing costs decrease over the same peri-
ods. Therefore, the quoted bid-ask spread does not change significantly around earnings 
announcements. The results show that the components in the bid-ask spread vary and they 
are dependent on sample-specific patterns. Further studies of the bid-ask spread are rele-
vant because of the information asymmetry around earnings announcements.  
 
The results show more informational uncertainty with negative earnings surprises than with 
positive earnings surprises. A possible explanation of the different market responses to 
positive and negative earnings surprises may be that firms announcing below than expected 
earnings creates uncertainty among market participants. Similar to Krinsky and Lee (1996), 
the results support the hypothesis that adverse-selection costs of the bid-ask spread in-
creases, which implies that the increase occurs because of a higher probability that a mar-
ket maker is trading with an informed trader with superior information. The economic mag-
nitude of changes in the adverse-selection component for earnings announcements is com-
parable to the change in inventory-holding and order-processing components, i.e. the 
quoted spread does not change significantly despite the increase in information asymmetry 
around earnings announcements. The overall results may be interpreted as evidence of a 
state of temporarily increased information asymmetry. 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows: section II reviews existing models that explains 
the bid-ask spread, starting with Roll (1984), and it discusses the transaction pricing proc-
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ess of the expected development in the bid-ask spread around earnings announcements; 
section III describes the data set of earnings announcements and the empirical methodol-
ogy, which is similar to the methodology proposed by Stoll (1989) and George et al. 
(1991); section IV presents the empirical results of estimating the information content in the 
bid-ask spread and the explanation of the development in the spread; and section V pro-
vides concluding remarks. 
 
 
II.  Explanations of the Bid-Ask Spread 
Ho and Stoll (1981,1983) provide the first real attempt at modeling the components of the 
bid-ask spread while earlier studies by Demsetz (1968) and Tinic (1972) describe the 
market makers' ability to provide market participants liquidity service. Ho and Stoll 
(1981,1983) modeled the behavior of market makers as a result of trading under uncer-
tainty and that the market makers' compensation in part comes from the bid-ask spread be-
cause trading moves holding positions away from a preferred inventory level. This inven-
tory-holding cost is the part of the bid-ask spread that reflects the return to market makers 
for accumulating undesired inventory, i.e. it represents costs to specialists for sustaining a 
portfolio of stocks that is not fully diversified.4 Another component is the order-processing 
cost that represents the market makers' costs for providing liquidity and processing ser-
vices for buy and sell orders, i.e. order-processing costs are the market makers' fee for 
matching buying and selling orders and the insurance for completing transactions. Copeland 
and Galai (1983) and Glosten and Milgrom (1985) demonstrate that market makers' com-
pensation for the risk of completing transactions with traders that possess superior infor-
mation are in the form of a higher bid-ask spread. This adverse-selection cost induces a 
positive bid-ask spread whenever the risk of trading with informed traders is high, i.e. 
when a market maker believes to be trading with an informed trader the quoted bid and ask 
prices will decrease (increase) whether the informed trader last bought or sold shares. The 
                                                
4 The market makers uses the quoted bid-ask spread to adjust inventory holdings, i.e. raising (lowing) the 
bid and ask prices when inventory becomes low (high). 
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next section describes models that are developed to explain the different components of the 
bid-ask spread.5 
 
 
A.  Theoretical Models 
Roll (1984) proposes a simple model that account for the impact the bid-ask spread has on 
asset returns. Roll shows that the covariance of transaction returns is an estimation of the 
effective spread, i.e. the realized spread in an efficient market, in which the observed mar-
ket prices depend on a security’s fundamental value and the difference between bid and ask 
prices (Stoll, 1989). The transaction price Pt is equal to a fixed fundamental value 
v
tP  plus 
half the spread ½×S×It, where It is –1 for bid prices and +1 for ask prices. Roll assumes that 
It occurs with equal probabilities whether or not a trade is initiated by buyer or seller. Us-
ing this simple model, the effective spread is best described by 2× cov- .6 But, the prob-
lem with Roll’s description of the spread is that only the order-processing component is 
included when considering the fundamental value. In addition, it is assumed that the ex-
pected return is constant through time and adverse-selection cost does not exist. However, 
decomposing the bid-ask spread into several factors makes it difficult to explain the behav-
ior of the spread while maintaining an assumption of constant expected returns. 
 
Glosten (1985) provides an asymmetric-information model that only explains the adverse 
selection cost of the bid-ask spread. Glosten shows that under risk-neutrality the common-
information price is given by P= E[Pv | W] where W is the publicly available information 
set and the adverse-selection (Aa+Ab), inventory-holding and order-processing (Ca+Cb) 
components are decomposed in the bid and the ask price. The spread is the sum of 
Aa+Ab+Ca+Cb. Assuming that all traders have the same information set, Glosten uses the 
                                                
5 Studies on inventory-holding costs and order-processing costs are Demsetz (1968), Stoll (1978), Ami-
hud and Mendelson (1980), and Ho and Stoll (1981,1983). Studies on adverse-selection costs are Cope-
land and Galai (1983), Glosten (1985), Glosten and Milgrom (1983), Easley and O’Hara (1987), and 
George, Kaul, and Nimalendran (1991). 
6 This simple measure of the spread is based on two assumptions: 1) the expected return for any given 
security is constant through time and 2) adverse-selection costs do not exist. George et al. (1991) argue 
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following expectation operator for possible bid and ask prices; a(x)=E[Pv |W È {investor 
buys at x}] and b(y)=E[Pv |W È {investor buys at y}], respectively. Assuming that the 
market makers determine bid and ask prices so that expected costs are covered in the 
spread, the quoted bid and ask prices are: 
 
Pa = a(Pa) + Ca = P + (a(Pa)-P) + Ca = P + Aa + Ca   [1] 
Pb = a(Pb) + Cb = P + (P-b(Pb)) + Cb = P + Ab + Cb   [2] 
 
A major implication of the expected bid and ask prices is that only a portion of the total 
spread covers the basic costs. In addition, the impact from the quoted bid and ask prices on 
the transaction prices is a high correlation between the common information price Pn after 
the nth transaction and whether a trade Qn is initiated by the buyer or seller, which takes 
the value –1 and +1, respectively. The next transaction price is E[Pn]=Pn+Qn. Glosten 
(1985) shows that Pn and Qn must be correlated due to the existence of adverse-selection 
costs. Similar to Roll (1984), the change in the transaction prices displays reversals due to 
the inventory holding and order processing costs but the adverse-selection cost component 
tends to be permanent. Therefore, it is only inventory-holding and order-processing costs 
that cause negative serial correlation in returns, which leads Glosten to argue that Rolls 
measure of the spread understates the realized spread. 
 
George, Kaul and Nimalendran (1991) develop a model that allows for time-varying re-
turns and provides unbiased estimates of the spread and its components. They argue that 
positive autocorrelation in the expected time varying returns creates an estimation bias. 
Stoll (1989) argues for unbiased estimates of the probability of a price reversal and price 
continuation, however, the parameters may be biased because they are nonlinear transfor-
mations of prices (Affleck-Graves et al., 1994). To eliminate estimation bias George et al. 
(1991) propose an alternative model that provides unbiased estimators. However, the 
model requires zero inventory-holding cost. Using an OLS-regression, it is possible to es-
                                                                                                                                              
that the expected time varying returns are positive autocorrelated and therefore the estimators are bias of 
both the spread and its components. 
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timate the adverse-selection and order-processing cost of the spread under the assumption 
that the spread is independent of trade size and that there exists equal ex-ante probabilities 
for trading at the bid and the ask price. The estimation allows for the “true” expected return 
of a security to vary through time. This affects the estimators of the level of the spread and 
its components. Affleck-Graves, Hedge and Miller (1994) use a version of George et al.'s 
(1991) model to test for differences between the components on the New York Stock Ex-
change (NYSE) and the National Association of Security Dealers Automated Quotations 
(NASDAQ)/National Market System (NMS) Stocks. The advantage of this approach is that 
it allows for a separation of the impact from the different systems. 
 
Si  = a0  +  a1×Sqi  +  a2×D  +  a3×(D×Sqi)  + e   [3] 
 
where Siº 2× ( )1,cov -- itit RDRD ; RDit ºRiTt–RiBt, RiTt is the continuously compounded 
transaction return on security i in period t and RiBt is the continuously compounded return 
from bid quotes following transaction prices; Sqi is the quoted spread on security i; D is +1 
if the stock is quoted on the NASDAQ and 0 if listed on NYSE. The most commonly used 
methodology to investigate the bid-ask spread follows Glosten and Harris (1988), Stoll 
(1989), and George, Kaul and Nimalendran (1991). However, new studies are refining the 
decomposition of the bid-ask spread to examine the observed patterns of spread revisions.7 
(see Krinsky and Lee (1996) and Affleck-Graves et al. (1994)) 
 
 
B.  Transaction Process 
The observed price changes are not independent because transactions happen at either bid 
or ask prices, therefore, negative serial dependence in observed transaction prices is an-
ticipated. Roll (1984) uses the following argument for negative serial covariance. Con-
sider the development in the bid-ask spread S at time t0, the ask and bid prices are 
a
oP and 
                                                
7 Glosten and Harris (1988) measures the bid-ask spread by the sum of the order-processing and adverse 
selection components and both components are a linear function of the transaction size. George, Kaul and 
Nimalendran (1991) allow the expected returns to be serially dependent. 
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b
oP , respectively, assuming that all transactions are constant at S. The transaction price ar-
rives randomly within the quoted bid-ask spread and they are equally likely. The quoted 
spread may be different than the effective or realized bid-ask spread. Thus, price changes 
occur only if unanticipated information arrives to the marketplace, i.e. with no new infor-
mation there will be no serial covariance in price changes (DPtºPt-Pt-1). If vP  is fixed, a 
constant bid-ask bounce, and the quoted prices can only take two values then the changes in 
the fundamental value, vtP , displays only volatility and negative serial correlation. If the 
current transaction price is the ask price Pa (the bid price, Pb) then a price change between 
Pt and Pt-1 is 0 or s (0 or +s). The next price change between Pt+1 and Pt is 0 or –s (0 or s). 
Thus, the probability distribution for successive price changes that is conditioned on no 
new information, is dependent on whether the last transaction was at the bid or the ask 
price. Roll (1984) shows that the variance of the observed prices is domi nated by new in-
formation while the covariance does not dependent on new information assuming efficient 
markets. Also, the spread-induced serial covariance is independent of the time increments 
in successive prices. Therefore, following Roll’s assumption of a constant spread, the bid 
and ask prices will always bounce symmetrically around the fundamental price, i.e. the 
spread reflects only order-processing costs. Stoll (1989) modifies the possible paths of 
observed market prices to adjustments for inventory-holding costs and adverse-selection 
costs.  
 
 
 
Panel A: Order-processing costs 
 
Time  0                           1 
         A                               A 
 
                                                 True price 
 
         B                                B 
 
Panel B: Inventory-holding costs 
 
Time  0                           1 
         A                          A 
 
                                                   True price 
 
         B                           B 
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Panel C: Adverse-selection costs 
 
Time  0                              1 
         A                              A True price   
                                              at t=0 
 
 
         B                               B True price   
                                              at t=1 
 
Panel D: Transaction prices 
 
Time  0                   1                      2 
         A                                           A 
                             (1-p) 
                               A           ¶×S 
                                          p 
                              -(1-¶)×S          A  
            p   (1-¶)×S 
         B                          p             B 
              -¶×S    (1-p)      (1-¶)×S 
                               B 
                                               (1-p) 
                                       -¶×S 
                                                       B 
 
Panel A is similar to Roll's (1984) description of the bid-ask spread that follows a naï ve 
order-processing costs model. Panel B shows the inventory-holding costs as reflected by 
the spread. Based on these models, the market makers tend to changes the spread relative to 
the fundamental price so that their inventories are maintained around a preferred level. 
Stoll (1989) argues that new transaction prices are determined in such a way that market 
makers are indifferent between bid or ask transactions and the inventory-holding costs 
move symmetrically around the initiated trade price. This leaves the market maker with 
0.5×S, if a trade is reversed. Panel C reflects the spread from the adverse-selection costs, 
which moves similarly to the inventory-holding costs. The reason is that the transaction at 
bid (ask) indicate that the expected equilibrium price is lower (higher). But, the price 
change assumes that traders possess superior information. The expected spread, ( aoP -
b
oP )/2, changes when a transaction conveys information to the market makers, who revise 
the expected equilibrium price to ( aP1 -
bP1 )/2. Stoll (1989) argues that the realized spread 
is smaller than the market makers' quoted spread because it depends only on adverse-
selection costs and inventory-holding costs. 
 
Stoll (1989) extended Roll's (1984) model of the bid-ask spread by estimating the prob-
abilities of price reversal and the magnitude of the price changes. Panel D shows all pos-
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sible sequences of transaction prices starting at the bid price. The price continuation is ¶×S 
and the size of the price reversal is (1-¶)×S, where ¶ is between zero and one. The prob-
ability of a price reversal is p and a continuation is (1-p) and the covariance of transaction 
prices and quoted prices are: 
 
 Covp  º cov ( )ptpt PP 1, +DD   = S2[¶2×(1-2p) - p2×(1-2¶)]   [4] 
 Cova,b  º cov ( )batbat PP ,1, , +DD   = S2×¶2×(1-2p)     [5] 
 
With a constant spread the serial covariance for bid prices is equal to the serial covariance 
for ask prices.8 Empirical findings show that the probability of a reversal is greater than 
0.5 and that the size of the price reversal ¶ less than or equal to 0.5. Roll (1984) assumes 
that ¶ is equal to 0.0 and p is equal to 0.5 in the order processing model while Copeland 
and Galai (1983) and Glosten and Milgrom (1985) use ¶ equal to 0.5 and p greater than 
0.5 in their adverse selection model. In the pure inventory holding model by Ho and Stoll 
(1985) ¶ = 0.5 and 1 > p > 0. 
 
 
III.  Data Material and Empirical Estimation 
A.  Data Material 
Earnings announcements are shown to convey new (positive or negative) information and 
the events are reasonably predictable. The data material provides evidence on whether un-
informed market makers believe that earnings announcements increase the information 
asymmetry. Pre-event, event, and post-event periods are analyzed to confirm whether in-
formed traders utilize information uncertainty prior to earnings releases. The pre-event 
window is from 45 days to 16 days before an earnings announcement. The event window is 
from 15 days before to 15 days after an announcement and the post-event window is 16 
                                                
8 The serial covariance equations are derived from the transaction process. In Roll (1984) and Stoll 
(1989) a formal proof is derived. Roll (1984) shows that when ¶ is 0 and p is 0.5 then the covp equals –
0.25×S2. Stoll (1989) shows that the total change in security prices equals the price changes due to the 
spread. 
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days to 45 days after an earnings announcement. The data set includes transaction prices, 
price quotations, and annual earnings announcements for firms on the Copenhagen Stock 
Exchange between 1989 and 1996. A total of 976 earnings announcements are identified. 
The earnings announcements and the pricing data are gathered from Datastream. 9 The trans-
action prices are the daily closing prices and quoted prices are the bid and ask prices. But 
the analysis only includes observations when daily bid-ask quotes can be matched against 
the closing transaction price. 
 
[INSERT TABLE I] 
 
The summary statistics presented in table I show the differences between event periods in 
the mean serial covariance, the share price, the trading volume, the turnover ratio, and the 
market values. Covb, Cova, and Covp are serial covariance of daily closing bid, ask and 
transaction prices. S is the average proportional bid-ask spread. Price is the cross-
sectional average stock price in the event window. Volume is the average volume of trad-
ing in the event window. The turnover variable is the average cross-sectional turnover ra-
tio in each event window. Market value is the average market value for the sample of firms 
included in the analysis. 
 
Comparable to the findings of Krinsky and Lee (1996), the traded number of outstanding 
shares times transaction prices and the turnover ratio (the number of shares traded divided 
by the outstanding shares) increases around earnings announcements. Although, difference 
in mean between periods are not statistically significant at any level. Admati and Pflei-
derer (1988) argue that an increase in trading volume will induce lower adverse selection 
while Foster and Viswanathan (1990) argue that an increase in volume will induce more 
information asymmetry. Therefore, the observed increase in volume may have significant 
impact on the adverse-selection cost in the bid-ask spread. The proportional spread in-
                                                
9 Transaction and quoted prices are gathered when available for earnings announcements. A major disad-
vantage of the data set is that it is not possible to gather intra-day transaction prices. Krinsky and Lee 
(1996) estimate covp on the latest transaction price in each half-hour interval while Stoll (1989) and Af-
fleck-Graves, Hedge and Miller (1994) require each stock to have a minimum of three transactions on at 
least fifteen trading days in each month. 
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creases significantly at a 5 percent level between the event window and the post-event 
window. The bid-ask spread between the pre-event and event windows does not increase 
significantly. Krinsky and Lee (1996) argue that the earnings announcement may still have 
an impact on the information asymmetry because of the individual components in the bid-
ask spread. The difference between serial covariance of transaction prices for each period 
is not statistically significant. However, the serial covariance of the quoted bid and ask 
prices experiences a significant increase from the pre-event window to the event and post-
event windows. An interpretation of the wider spread around earnings announcements may 
be that the market makers suspect an increased level of information asymmetry. Jaffe and 
Winkler (1976) show that firm-specific information may lead to greater information asym-
metry, i.e. changes in the trading behavior by informed and uninformed market participants. 
A wider bid-ask spread offsets higher expected losses to the market makers for trading 
with informed investors. The next section investigates the magnitude of the bid-ask spread 
components. 
 
 
B.  Empirical Estimation 
Regressions [6,7] are used to estimate the price continuation parameter ¶ and the probabil-
ity for a price reversal p. The adverse-selection, the inventory-holding, and the order-
processing components of the spread are estimated from the serial covariance on the 
squared bid-ask spread. The estimated parameters are obtained for each period by averag-
ing the estimates of the OLS coefficients of a1 and b1. The proportional spread is based on 
serial covariance of the difference in transaction returns and the returns from bid-bid and 
ask-ask prices. Using returns instead of price differences eliminates autocovariance in 
time-varying expected returns (George et al. 1991). 
 
Covp    = ao + a1×S2 + u     [6] 
Cova,b  = bo + b1×S2 + v     [7] 
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where S denotes the quoted proportional spread as the difference between the ask and bid 
prices, divided by the average of the ask and the bid; covp is the serial covariance of the 
returns of the transaction closing prices; cova,b is the serial covariance of the returns of the 
bid and ask prices; u, v are random errors. The intermediate values of ¶ and p are found 
from two auxiliary equations that provide the three components that are used to estimate the 
magnitude of the bid-ask spread. 
 
a1 = ¶ 2 ×(1 - 2×p) - p2×(1 - 2×¶)  and  b1 = ¶  2×(1 - 2×p) 
 
Stoll (1989) made three empirical assumptions for p and ¶: 1) the market is efficient in the 
sense that the expected price changes in a security is independent of current and past infor-
mation; 2) the spread, S, is constant over the analyzed period of one-month;10 3) all transac-
tions are carried out at the highest bid and or at the lowest ask price available in the mar-
ket. Based on these assumptions the three components of the bid-ask spread are determined 
as: 
 
Adverse-selection costs: [ 1 – 2×(p - ¶) ] 
Inventory-holding costs: 2×(p - 0.5) 
Order-processing costs: (1-2×¶) 
 
Stoll's (1989) method provides estimates of the amount charge in cents for each component 
of the spread per dollar of stock price. Multiplying the proportional components of the per-
centage-spread shows the costs per dollar of price. Table II shows the results of serial co-
variance against the squared proportional bid-ask spread for the pre-event, event, and post-
event window. 
 
[INSERT TABLE II] 
 
                                                
10 This assumption may be relaxed to allow for random variations in the spread. 
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The estimation parameters a1 and b1 are from cova,b=
bababa S ,2,1
,
0 ebb +×+  and 
covp=
pbaba S ebb +×+ 2,1
,
0 , respectively. Panel A shows bid prices, panel B shows ask 
prices, and panel C shows transaction prices. The estimated a1 coefficients are all nega-
tive and statistically significant. Similar to the findings in Stoll (1989), this result confirms 
the expectation of the implied spread, i.e. covp £ 0.0. The overall value of a1 is based on 
the serial covariance between daily closing prices. It is -0.117, -0.072, and -0.129 in the 
pre-event, event, and post-event window, respectively. The squared bid-ask spread ex-
plains the cross-sectional variation of the serial covariance at 4.39 percent, 1.97 percent, 
and 20.12 percent in the pre-event, event, and post-event window, respectively. The esti-
mated value of b1 is the average coefficient from panel A and B, and it is based on the se-
rial covariance of the bid and the ask prices. The b1 coefficients are all negative and statis-
tically significant in four of the six estimations. The negative values support the inventory-
holding cost explanation (Stoll, 1989). 
 
Under the assumption of the market efficiency hypothesis, the expected value of a0 and b0 
is 0.0. However, the estimated values are significant in six of the nine regressions. From 
the transaction prices, a0 is small and positive, while from the bid and ask prices, b0 is 
small and negative. Stoll (1989) argues that positive intercepts may reflect a form of mar-
ket efficiency due to a delay in price adjustments. The negative intercepts may reflect the 
differences in actual transaction sizes that exceed transactions that are implied in the 
quoted bid-ask spread. 
 
Roll (1984) shows that the implied spread is related to firm size and Stoll (1989) shows 
that the quoted spread is related to volume of trading, the stock price, the number of market 
makers, and the underlying risk of the security. Affleck-Graves et al (1994) argue that im-
portant characteristics of the bid-ask spread are the structure of trading and stock specific 
characteristics. The relationship between the quoted and realized spread is examined with 
the following equations: 
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covp  = a0  +  a1×S2  + a2×S2×X    [8] 
cova,b  = b0  +   b1×S2  + b2×S2×X    [9] 
 
where a1=a1+a2×X and b1=b1+b2×X . The variables to explain serial covariance are the 
average stock price, the average daily volume divide by outstanding shares, the turnover 
ratio the average daily volume divided by outstanding shares, and the average market 
value.11 The turnover ratio reflects the degree of informational trading and therefore, re-
flects the adverse-selection costs (Stoll, 1989). It is expected that the transition from the 
pre-event to the event period around earnings announcements increases the information 
asymmetry. Stoll (1989) argues that in the absence of information asymmetry, trading hap-
pens in proportions to the outstanding amount.  
 
Table III summaries the regression results, and similar to Stoll (1989), it appears that the 
stock characteristics do not influence the estimation parameter, a1. The results show that 
the cross-sectional difference is reflected in the spread and not in the transaction price pa-
rameters. Similar to Stoll (1989) it is evident that the parameter a1 is not dependent on the 
stock characteristics. The positive turnover ratio may imply that the greater the turnover, 
the less the serial covariance. But, the turnover ratio is not statistically significant. 
 
[INSERT TABLE III] 
 
The stock price coefficient in covprice  is negative and statistically significant while the co-
efficient in cova,b is only significant and negative in one of six regressions. The negative 
coefficient implies that higher stock prices lead to higher negative covariance. Stoll (1989) 
finds positive coefficients and argues that this may imply greater adverse-information costs 
in higher-priced stocks.  
 
 
                                                
11 A similar setup is proposed in Stoll (1989) but there is no theoretical justification for the chosen vari-
ables except turnover ratio. 
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IV.  The Magnitude of the Bid-Ask Components 
A.  Change in Bid-Ask Components Around Earnings Announcements 
Panel A of table IV summaries the adverse-selection, inventory-holding, and order-
processing costs in proportion to the bid-ask spread percentage. The results indicate that 
the information asymmetry changes around earnings announcements. The adverse-selection 
costs increase from 55 percent to 72 percent of the quoted proportional spread. Following 
earnings announcements in the post-event window, the adverse-selection costs decrease to 
51 percent. The difference in the components between the event and pre-event windows 
and post-event and event windows is 16.4 percent and -20.6 percent. Consistent with the 
findings in Krinsky and Lee (1996), the results suggest that in a thirty-day window the in-
formation asymmetry increase around the earnings announcement. The results suggest that 
earnings announcements provide important pricing information, which supplies the in-
formed traders with information advantages over the market makers. The findings in Kim 
and Verrecchia (1994) and Krinsky and Lee (1996) suggest similar results, but the informa-
tion disadvantage does not induce the market makers to increase the bid-ask spread. 
 
[INSERT TABLE IV] 
 
The auxiliary equations are nonlinear transformations of the estimation parameters and the 
distribution of the spread components is unknown, therefore, a bootstrapping technique is 
applied. The bootstrapping method by Affleck-Graves et al. (1994) and Krinsky and Lee 
(1996) is applied to make inference of the difference between each window.12 Further-
more, the distribution of the components is affected by covp, which may not be independent 
of cova,b and the parameters may not be independent (Affleck-Graves et al, 1994). 
 
The results in table IV show that inventory-holding costs around earnings announcements 
are reduced to 18.9 percent from 26.7 percent in the pre-event window however, the de-
                                                
12 The appendix in Affleck-Graves et al (1994) provide an excellent description of the applied bootstrap-
ping technique that is used to estimate p-values of whether or not the components of the spread are sig-
nificant different between periods. 
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crease is not statistically significant at any level. The inventory-holding costs increase 
12.28 percent after the event window, which may be due to the increase in volume and the 
turnover. Krinsky and Lee (1996) argue that higher volume induces the market makers to 
tighten the spread because of economics of scale, while the increase in volatility induces 
wider spread, because of the risk of holding inventory. The order-processing cost declines 
from 17.9 percent in the pre-event window to 9.3 percent in the event window however, 
the decrease is not statistically significant at any level. It seems that the inventory-holding 
and order-processing costs move together. The reduction in the realized spread may not be 
reflected in the changes in the quoted spread. The realized spread is the expected price 
change from a purchase minus a sale, i.e. the spread is 2×(p-¶)×S. This spread represents, 
the market makers expected profit but the change in the realized spread indicates a de-
crease in the market makers realized profit. The cost per dollar of price estimates shown in 
panel B are obtained by multiplying the proportional spread with the mean percentage 
spread, similar to the methodology used by Affleck-Graves, Hedge, and Miller (1994). The 
change in cost per dollar moves similarly to the cost component, but the magnitude depends 
on the average cross-sectional spread for each window. The adverse-selection costs of an 
average stock price at 486.12 (DKK) during the post-event window (see table I) decreases 
by 57.75 (DKK). The average realized spread increases by 281.89 (DKK) per round trip 
transaction. 
 
Table IV shows an increase in the adverse-selection cost that is caused by the information 
asymmetry. The market values change the components of the spread because they face in-
formed traders. The trading volume increases around the earnings announcements however, 
the increase is not statistically significant, which Krinsky and Lee (1996) argue reduces the 
realized spread. George et al. (1991) finds no evidence of an inventory-holding cost. This 
may be explained by the difference in the time period. Stoll (1989), Affleck-Graves et al. 
(1994) use three months and two months, respectively, while George et al. (1991) uses a 
time horizon of five years.13 Around earnings announcements the inventory-holding cost is a 
                                                
13 Roll (1984) and Glosten (1987) shows that different interval used to measure serial covariance does 
not affect estimates of the order-processing costs or the adverse-selection costs. Greoge et al. (1991) 
argues that high frequency data is more appropriate because autocovariance-based spread suffer from 
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significant part of the quoted spread. Krinsky and Lee (1996) find that the adverse-
selection cost increase significantly form 59.5 percent to 76.4 percent from the pre-event 
window to the event window. The inventory-holding and order-processing costs decrease 
approximately by 10 percent. This lead Krinsky and Lee (1996) to conclude that earnings 
announcements may have an insignificant impact on the total spread but it may increase in-
formation asymmetry. Stoll (1989) finds an adverse-selection cost of 47 percent, which is 
similar to Krinsky and Lee (1996) in their benchmark period. In contrast, Venkatesh and 
Chiang (1986) find no increase in the information asymmetry but if the earnings announce-
ment is followed by another announcement the information asymmetry increases signifi-
cantly. This suggests that non-normal information asymmetry exists before earnings an-
nouncements. Affleck-Graves et al. (1994) find that the adverse-selection cost is 50 per-
cent on NYSE and it is 36 percent on NASDAQ. The inventory-holding cost is 47 percent 
for NYSE and 17 percent for NASDAQ. The order-processing cost is 1 percent for NYSE 
and 47 percent NASDAQ. Comparing the NYSE to the NASDAQ indicates that the adverse-
selection and the order-processing costs significantly influence the trading structure. It may 
be due to the auction-based trading on the NYSE and the multiple dealers on the NASDAQ. 
 
 
B.  Positive and Negative Earnings Surprises 
In the information asymmetry model, consistent with the liquidity traders and the informed 
traders, the market makers carry losses from trading with informed traders. The informa-
tion that the informed traders trade on is not currently reflected in the prices, therefore, the 
market makers may recover potential losses through the bid-ask spread. Thus, the expecta-
tion is that the information asymmetry among the market participants induces a wider 
spread. Hence, partitioning the announcements into two groups, one with positive earnings 
surprises and a second with negative earnings surprises, to estimate the magnitude and the 
changes in the adverse-selection, inventory-holding, and order-processing components. 
 
[INSERT TABLE V] 
                                                                                                                                              
small-sample bias, i.e. the difference time interval significantly effects estimators of the spread and its 
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Panel A in table V shows that the components in the realized spread change significantly 
between the pre-event window and the event window. The inventory-holding cost in-
creases from 15.9 percent to 25.5 percent, which implies that the market makers are hold-
ing more non-preferable inventory to maintain their liquidity service. To outweigh the in-
ventory-holding costs, the market makers reduce the order-processing costs. However, the 
realized spread does not change for the group of positive earnings surprises. This may im-
ply that less information asymmetry among market participants exists around positive earn-
ings surprises. The cost per dollar of price for positive earnings surprises in panel B 
shows an increase in the inventory-holding costs and a decrease in the order-processing 
costs. The economic magnitude implies that the adverse-selection costs for an average 
stock price of DKK 538.25 for positive earnings surprises decreases by DKK 3.45 (øre) 
during the event window. The average realized spread increases by DKK 76.59 (øre) per 
round-trip transaction. 
 
Panel C in table V shows that the information asymmetry increases significantly among the 
market participants between the pre-event window, the event window, and the post-event 
window for negative earnings surprises. The negative 20.2 percent decrease in inventory-
holding costs implies that the market makers hold less inventory in which information 
asymmetry exists. Between the event window and the post event window, the inventory-
holding cost is reversed. This implies that the change in the realized spread is temporary in 
the event window. In addition, the decrease from 69.5 percent to 37.2 percent in the real-
ized spread (or gross profit) from pre-event window to event window implies that it is 
costly for the market makers when trading with informed market participants. 
 
The cost per dollar of price for negative earnings surprises in panel D shows a decrease in 
the inventory-holding costs and a decrease in the order-processing costs. This implies that 
the transaction costs change significantly. The economic magnitude implies that the ad-
verse-selection costs for an average stock price of DKK 452.46 for negative earnings sur-
                                                                                                                                              
components. 
 20
prises increased by DKK 2.26 during the event window. The average realized spread de-
clined by DKK 2.26 per round trip transaction. As Krinsky and Lee (1996) argue, the mag-
nitude of the change in the realized spread appears to be important but the change in the 
total spread is negligible. 
 
Overall, the results in table V show an increasing and significant adverse-selection cost 
around negative earnings surprises. The component represents 62.9 percent (30.5 percent) 
of the quoted proportional spread for the event (pre-event) window. This implies consid-
erable information asymmetry among market participants and more information uncertainty 
around negative earnings surprises than around positive earnings surprises. One possible 
explanation is that earnings information that is below expected creates uncertainty among 
market participants. Similar to Krinsky and Lee (1996), the results show support for the 
hypothesis that the adverse-selection costs of the bid-ask spread increases. The interpreta-
tion of the increase is that it occurs because of a higher probability that a market maker is 
trading with an informed trader with superior information. But, the results do not show 
support for Krinsky and Lee's (1996) hypothesis that the adverse-selection component in-
creases following the announcement. The results suggest that the information asymmetry 
after the earnings announcement return to the level of the pre-event window. This implies 
that the informed traders' ability to assess firms' performance only affect the bid-ask spread 
in the event window around earnings announcements. 
 
 
V.  Conclusion 
The changes in the bid-ask spread components around earnings announcements show that 
earnings surprises convey relevant pricing information and that significant informational 
asymmetry exists between market makers and informed traders. The adverse-selection 
component and the trading volume increase while the inventory-holding component and the 
order-processing component decreases around earnings announcements. The results show 
an increase in the information asymmetry and that the informed traders have an informa-
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tional advantage over market makers. But, the market makers informational disadvantage 
does not induce an increase in the quoted bid-ask spread. 
 
Partitioning the earnings announcements into positive surprises and negative surprises 
shows that the realized bid-ask spread does not change for good surprises while for bad 
surprises the information asymmetry increase significantly. The results imply that less in-
formation asymmetry exists among market participants around positive earnings surprises. 
The change in the spread for negative earnings surprises is temporary in the event window, 
implying that it is costly for market makers when trading with informed market participants. 
A possible explanation of the different market responds to positive and negative earnings 
surprises may be that firms announcing earnings below expectations creates uncertainty 
among market participants. The economic magnitude of changes in the adverse-selection 
component for earnings announcements is comparable to the change in the inventory-
holding and the order-processing components. The quoted spread does not change signifi-
cantly despite the fact that the information asymmetry increases around earnings announce-
ments. The overall results may be interpreted as evidence of temporary increased informa-
tion asymmetry. 
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Table I  Descriptive Statistics 
The sample includes earnings announcements from firms on the Copenhagen Stock Exchange between 1989 and 1996. The pre-event window is from 45 days to 16 day before an earn-
ings announcement. The event window is from 15 days before to 15 days after an announcement. The post-event is 16 to 45 days after earnings announcement. Covb, Cova, and Covp 
are serial covariance of daily closing bid, ask and transaction price. S is the average proportional quoted bid-ask spread. Price is the cross-sectional average stock price for each event 
window. Volume is the average trading volume in the month. Turnover is the average cross-sectional turnover ratio for each period. Market value is the average market value of the 
firms in the sample. t-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
Panel A Pre-event Event Post-event Difference 
Sample size N=606 N=595 N=597    
Panel B 
Variable 
 
Mean 
 
Std 
 
Mean 
 
Std 
 
Mean 
 
Std 
Event – 
pre event 
Post –  
Event 
Post –  
Pre event 
Covp -0.2604 6.0997 -0.2267 4.5169 -0.5493 3.9977 0.0337 
(0.11) 
-0.3226 
(-1.31) 
-0.2888 
(-0.97) 
Cova -0.3582 2.2584 -1.0416 5.4918 -1.3333 4.4319 -0.6833 
(-2.84)a 
-0.2918 
(-1.01) 
-0.9751 
(-4.84)a 
Covb -0.5162 4.4649 -0.8699 4.0187 -1.1401 5.9932 -0.3536 
(-1.45) 
-0.2703 
(-0.91) 
-0.6239 
(-2.05)a 
Spread, % 1.72 1.44  1.72 1.34 2.18  1.56 0.00 
(0.04) 
0.46  
(3.31)a 
0.46 
(3.31)a 
Price 496.18 562.46 494.27 582.60 486.12 552.24 -1.92 
(-0.06) 
-8.15  
(-0.26) 
-10.07 
(0.33) 
Volume 16.18 36.48 19.62 50.01 15.74 35.17 3.44 
(-1.25) 
-3.88  
(-1.34) 
-0.44 
(-0.12) 
Turnover Ratio 
% 
5.20 11.47 6.06 13.43 5.18  11.11 0.87 
(1.10) 
-0.88  
(-1.07) 
-0.01 
(-0.05) 
Market value 2121.95 3980.06 2123.94 4128.15 2161.40 4075.05 1.99 
(0.01) 
37.46 
(0.29) 
39.44 
(0.31) 
Panel C          
Spread, % - Posi-
tive 
1.55 1.17  1.61 1.11 2.10  1.49 0.06 
(0.59) 
0.49  
(4.34)a 
0.55 
(4.77)a 
Spread, % - Nega-
tive 
1.96 1.63  1.91 1.54 2.30  1.65 -0.05 
(-0.39) 
0.38  
(2.83)a 
0.33 
(2.39)a 
Price -  
Positive 
528.23 614.56 538.46 675.47 506.52 597,35 10.01 
(0.18) 
-31.72 
(-0.58) 
-21.71 
(-0.42) 
Price -  
Negative 
453,23 505,39 452,46 494,08 459,77 508,48 -0,77 
(-0.02) 
7.31  
(0.17) 
6.54 
(0.15) 
a,b Indicate statistically significance at the 5 and 1 percent level, respectively.  
 
Table II Regression results 
Regression of serial covariance against the squared proportional bid-ask spread for the pre-event, 
event, and post-event window. Covb, Cova, and Covp are serial covariance of daily closing bid, ask 
and transaction price. S is the average proportional bid-ask spread. The estimation parameters a1 
and b1 are from cova,b = 
bababa S ,2,1
,
0 ebb +×+  and covp =
ppp S eaa +×+ 210 , respectively. 
Panel A is for bid prices, panel B is for ask, and panel C is for transaction prices. t-statistics are 
shown in parentheses. 
 
 
Panel A: Bid Dependent 
 Variable 
 
 
b0 
 
b1 
 
R2 
     
Pre-event Covb -0.000022 -0.058436 0.0205 
  (-1.13) (-3.56)  
Event Covb -0.000069 -0.038617 0.0071 
  (-3.68) (-2.06)  
Post-event Covb -0.000096 -0.024896 0.0033 
  (-3.50) (-1.41)  
     
Panel B: Ask  b0 b1 R
2 
     
Pre-event Cova -0.000020 -0.031281 0.0229 
  (-2.01) (-3.77)  
Event Cova -0.000086 -0.039381 0.0039 
  (-3.35) (-1.53)  
Post-event Cova -0.000076 -0.080244 0.0635 
  (-3.85) (-6.36)  
     
Panel C: Price  a0 a1 R
2 
     
Pre-event Covp 0.000033 -0.116876 0.0439 
  (1.23) (-5.27)  
Event Covp 0.000012 -0.072412 0.0197 
  (0.56) (-3.46)  
Post-event Covp 0.000037 -0.128872 0.2012 
  (2.27) (-12.26)  
a,b Statistically significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
Table III Explanation of the bid-ask spread 
The sample includes earnings announcements from firms on the Copenhagen Stock Exchange between 1989 and 1996. The pre-event window is from 45 days to 16 day before an earn-
ings announcement. The event window is from 15 days before to 15 days after an announcement. The post-event is 16 to 45 days after earnings announcement. Covb, Cova, and Covp 
are serial covariance of daily closing bid, ask and transaction price. Price is the cross-sectional average stock price for each event window. Volume is the average trading volume in the 
month. Turnover is the average cross-sectional turnover ratio for each period. Market value is the average market value of the firms in the sample. t-statistics are shown in parenthe-
ses. 
  Pre-event window   Event window   Post-event window   Dependent 
Variable   X a0 a1 a2 R2 a0 a1 a2 R2 a0 a1 a2 R2 
Covprice Price 0.000037 -0.0001 -0.1027 0.0450 0.000004 0.0001 -0.1050 0.0313 0.000039 0.0000 -0.1360 0.2021 
  (1.35) (-0.86) (-3.71)b  (0.18) (2.65)b (-4.32)b  (2.32)b (0.83) (-10.06)b  
 Volume 0.000028 0.0015 -0.1272 0.0502 -0.000026 -0.0001 0.0317 0.0068 0.000008 0.0011 -0.0726 0.0634 
  (0.89) (0.87) (-5.16)b  (-1.44) (-0.09) (1.83)a  (0.49) (1.08) (-5.60)b  
 Turnover 0.000026 0.7731 -0.1303 0.0515 -0.000031 0.5976 0.0288 0.0104 0.000010 -0.0802 -0.0664 0.0613 
  (0.82) (1.20) (-5.26)b  (-1.74) (1.36) (1.67)  (0.57) (-0.17) (-5.47)b  
 Market 0.000024 0.0000 -0.1311 0.0521 0.000003 0.0000 -0.0782 0.0218 0.000053 0.0000 -0.1206 0.2462 
  (0.88) (2.27)b (-5.69)b  (0.12) (1.13) (-3.61)b  (3.24)b (-5.15)b (-10.62)b  
Covask Price -0.000010 -0.0001 0.0050 0.0792 -0.000081 -0.0001 -0.0178 0.0073 -0.000071 0.0000 -0.1094 0.0765 
  (-0.96) (-6.06)b (0.50)  (-3.10)b (-1.42) (-0.60)  (-3.59)b (2.91)b (-6.78)b  
 Volume -0.000024 0.0003 -0.0297 0.0198 -0.000097 0.0001 -0.0319 0.0024 -0.000077 0.0038 -0.1001 0.0715 
  (-1.99)a (0.53) (-3.19)b  (-3.17)b (0.05) (-1.08)  (-3.69)b (2.97)b (-6.10)b  
 Turnover -0.000024 0.2413 -0.0311 0.0213 -0.000097 0.0136 -0.0320 0.0024 -0.000076 0.3462 -0.0828 0.0557 
  (-2.07)b (0.99) (-3.32)b  (-3.15)b (0.02) (-1.09)  (-3.57)b (0.59) (-5.35)b  
 Market -0.000019 0.0000 -0.0292 0.0241 -0.000090 0.0000 -0.0412 0.0041 -0.000068 0.0000 -0.0950 0.0814 
  (-1.87)a (-0.87) (-3.37)b  (-3.29)b (0.33) (-1.55)  (-3.42)b (-0.07) (-6.85)b  
Covbid Price -0.000009 -0.0002 -0.0125 0.0435 -0.000061 -0.0001 -0.0038 0.0236 -0.000095 0.0000 -0.0339 0.0040 
  (-0.44) (-3.81)b (-0.61)  (-3.24)b (-3.16)b (-0.18)  (-3.41)b (0.65) (-1.50)  
 Volume -0.000028 -0.0008 -0.0580 0.0215 -0.000073 -0.0012 -0.0368 0.0099 -0.000065 0.0022 -0.1225 0.0509 
  (-1.15) (-0.62) (-3.11)b  (-3.38)b (-1.24) (-1.76)a  (-2.11)b (1.17) (-5.02)b  
 Turnover -0.000029 -0.0326 -0.0599 0.0209 -0.000077 -0.0148 -0.0383 0.0069 -0.000056 -0.7606 -0.1065 0.0499 
  (-1.23) (-0.07) (-3.19)b  (-3.51)b (-0.03) (-1.83)a  (-1.78)a (-0.88) (-4.67)b  
 Market -0.000025 0.0000 -0.0627 0.0219 -0.000066 0.0000 -0.0372 0.0074 -0.000112 0.00091 -0.0647 0.0577 
  (-1.26) (0.95) (-3.66)b  (-3.31)b (-0.35) (-1.92)a  (-4.12)b (5.78)b (-3.40)b  
a,b Statistically significant at 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
Table IV Components in the Bid-Ask Spread 
Components of the bid-ask spread are estimate for the pre-event, event, and post event window. Stoll’s 
(1989) methodology is used to estimate the spread. The pre-event window is from 45 days to 15 day before 
an earnings announcement. The event window is from 15 days before to 15 days after an announcement. 
The post-event is 15 to 45 days after earnings announcement. The sample includes a total of 690 
announcements from firms on the Copenhagen Stock Exchange from 1989 to 1996. The cost per dollar of 
price estimates are obtained by multiplying proportional spread with the mean percentage spread, similar to 
the methodology by Affleck-Graves, Hedge, and Miller (1994). The p-values in parentheses are obtained 
using a bootstrap simulation involving 10,000 replications. 
 
  
Estimated Components 
 
 
Difference 
 Pre-event Event Post-event Event -  
Pre 
Post -  
Event 
Post 
Pre 
Type:  
Panel A: Proportion of Percentage Spread 
 
Adverse selection cost 0.5534 0.7170 0.5110 0.1636 
(0.406) 
-0.2060 
(0.295) 
-0.0424 
(0.829) 
Inventory holding cost 0.2673 0.1897 0.3126 -0.0775 
(0.301) 
0.1228 
(0.204) 
0.0453 
(0.380) 
Order processing cost 0.1793 0.0933 0.1765 -0.0861 
(0.253) 
0.0832 
(0.259) 
-0.0029 
(0.491) 
  
Panel B: Cost per Dollar of Price 
 
Adverse selection cost 0.9521 1.2311 1.1123 0.2789 
(0.156) 
-0.1188 
(0.546) 
0.1602 
(0.416) 
Inventory holding cost 0.4598 0.3258 0.6804 -0.1340 
(0.183) 
0.3547 
(0.008)c 
0.2206 
(0.068)a 
Order processing cost 0.3085 0.1601 0.3841 -0.1484 
(0.125) 
0.2240 
(0.041)b 
0.0756 
(0.279) 
a,b,c Statistically significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
Table V Component of the Bid-Ask Spread for Positive and Negative News 
Components of the bid-ask spread are estimate for the pre-event, event, and post event window. Stoll’s (1989) methodology is used to estimate the spread. 
The pre-event window is from 45 days to 15 day before an earnings announcement. The event window is from 15 days before to 15 days after an 
announcement. The post-event is 15 to 45 days after earnings announcement. The sample includes a total of 690 announcements from firms on the 
Copenhagen Stock Exchange from 1989 to 1996. The cost per dollar of price estimates are obtained by multiplying proportional spread with the mean 
percentage spread, similar to the methodology by Affleck-Graves, Hedge, and Miller (1994). The p-values in parentheses are obtained using a bootstrap 
simulation involving 10,000 replications. 
 
  
Positive earnings surprises 
 
  
Negative earnings surprises 
 Estimated Components Difference  Estimated Components Difference 
 Pre-event Event Post-
event 
Event - 
Pre 
Post - 
Event 
Post 
Pre 
 Pre-
event 
Event Post-
event 
Event - 
Pre 
Post - 
Event 
Post 
Pre 
Type: Panel A: Proportional of Percentage Spread  Panel C: Proportional of Percentage Spread 
Adverse selection cost 0.6392 0.5656 0.6325 -0.0736 
(0.708) 
0.0669 
(0.734) 
-0.0067 
(0.973) 
 0.3046 0.6286 0.6994 0.3239 
(0.099)a 
0.0709 
(0.719) 
0.3948 
(0.045)b 
Inventory holding cost 0.1591 0.4142 0.3069 0.2551 
(0.043)b 
-0.1073 
(0.235) 
0.1478 
(0.159) 
 0.2849 0.0829 0.2613 -0.2020 
(0.087)a 
0.1784 
(0.115) 
-0.0236 
(0.0437) 
Order processing cost 0.2017 0.0203 0.0606 -0.1814 
(0.080)a 
0.0404 
(0.374) 
-0.1411 
(0.137) 
 0.4105 0.2886 0.0393 -0.1219 
(0.173) 
-0.2493 
(0.027)b 
-0.3712 
(0.002)c 
 Panel B: Cost per Dollar of Price  Panel D: Cost per Dollar of Price 
Adverse selection cost 0.7229 0.7166 0.8507 -0.0064 
(0.974) 
0.1341 
(0.496) 
0.1278 
(0.516) 
 0.4963 0.9963 1.0443 0.5000 
(0.011)b 
0.0480 
(0.801) 
0.5480 
(0.005)c 
Inventory holding cost 0.1799 0.5247 0.4127 0.3448 
(0.010)c 
-0.1120 
(0.225) 
0.2328 
(0.058)a 
 0.4641 0.1313 0.3901 -0.3328 
(0.013)b 
0.2587 
(0.041)b 
-0.0740 
(0.309) 
Order processing cost 0.2282 0.0257 0.0816 -0.2025 
(0.058)a 
0.0559 
(0.332) 
-0.1466 
(0.128) 
 0.6686 0.4574 0.0586 -0.2113 
(0.051)a 
-0.3987 
(0.001)c 
-0.6100 
(0.000)c 
a,b,c Statistically significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively.  
 
